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PRISONERS' REDRESS FOR DEPRIVATION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
DANIEL J. SHEEHAN, JR.

The propensity of federal courts to hear and determine prisoners'
claims concerning conditions of confinement has been increasing over
the past decade and all indications are that it will continue to do so.
The increase can be attributed to a changing ideology regarding prisons
and their function in society. If one regards a prison as strictly punitive
in nature, then deprivations of basic human liberties may seem less
abhorrent. It was recognized several years ago, however, that it is in the
best interest of society and moral conscience that prisons serve as
centers of rehabilitation.
Many penologists hold today that the primary purpose of prisons
is rehabilitation of' convicts and their restoration to society as
useful citizens; those penologists hold that other aims of penal
confinement, while perhaps legitimate, are of secondary importance. That has not always been the prevailing view of what
penitentiaries are for, if, indeed, it is today. In years past many
people have felt, and many still feel, that a criminal is sent to the
penitentiary to be punished for his crimes and to protect the public
from his further depredations.'
If rehabilitation is the primary objective of prisons, then a whole new
perspective has been created. While solitary confinement in an unheated,
unsanitary cell may be a perfectly reasonable means of inflicting punishment, it is decidedly inconsistent with the rehabilitative function.
Thus, if federal courts review prisoners' complaints with an eye toward
the purpose of prisons, justification for their intervention is more
easily provided.
While recognition of the primary function of prisons would allow
the courts to determine whether prison conditions align with this function, there still remains the need for order within the prisons. Main1 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). The court added that while often a sociological theory may ripen into constitutional
law, such has not been the case with the theory of rehabilitation. The court, therefore,
refused to hold that confinement in a prison that does not have rehabilitative programs is
unconstitutional. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1084, 93 L.
Ed. 1337, 1343 (1940): "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence."
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tenance of order will necessitate the withdrawal of certain liberties.
Even in society at large, certain liberties are given up for the benefits
of participating in society. The problem is striking a balance between
an ordered compatible society and allowance of maximum individual
freedom. The problem is more accentuated in a prison. Prisons require
a high degree of order which results in a proportionate loss of individual
liberty. Furthermore, prisoners, by definition, are those convicted of
taking a liberty which society has declared impermissible. The difficulty
in striking the proper balance in prisons is the chief reason for federal
.courts' unwillingness to intervene.
Prison administration has traditionally been the domain of prison
officials. The courts have felt that prison officials have the necessary
penological expertise, coupled with close contact with the particular
exigencies of prison administration, and have allowed wide latitude
in their determinations. 2 A recognition is developing, however, that
there are aspects of prison administration that only the courts are
particularly suited to review.
The federal courts do not sit to superintend the administration
of the .

.

. jail system; but what they do sit to do, and what they

must do, is insure that those who administer that system comply
with the requirements of the Constitution: The duty to confront
and resolve constitutional questions, regardless of their difficulty
or magnitude, is the very essence of judicial responsibility. While
federal courts must be sensitive to the problems created by unwarranted judicial interference with administration of state penal
institutions, when questions of constitutional dimensions arise,
the courts cannot simply abdicate their function
out of misplaced
3
deference to some sort of "hands-off" doctrine.
The above quotation reflects a new judicial philosophy, one that is
less content with vague abstractions and more concerned with protection of constitutional rights. Since a hearing in a federal forum is
closely tied with the assertion that a constitutional right has unjustifiably been denied, concentration centers on the tests which have developed to determine whether a prisoner is entitled to relief. Consonant
with the ready recognition that prisoners are entitled to their constitutional rights, has been the expansion of the remedies available to
2 Spaeth, The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1031 (1971).
-Judge Spaeth advances a very cogent argument that penological expertise is hardly a
necessary prerequisite to reviewing prison conditions.
No doubt it will be argued that judges are not. penologists and should not meddle
in prison administration. However, neither are judges economists, transportation
experts, or electrical engineers; and yet they regularly review decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Federal Power Commission.
Id. at 1042.
8 Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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assert these rights. The removal of the barriers which formerly prevented prisoners from seeking relief under federal habeas corpus is
examined, as are the reasons for the increasing popularity of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. 4 Clarification of the problem as to what types of

complaints are cognizable under habeas corpus and the Civil Rights
Act is attempted, with analysis of the courts' reluctance to allow
prisoners to circumvent the habeas exhaustion rule by filing suits
under the Civil Rights Act.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS

The effectiveness of post-conviction relief remedies has been largely
dependent on whether the federal courts will apply the "hands-off"
doctrine. 5 The essence of this doctrine is that the responsibility for
prison administration is vested in the Attorney General and it is
without the realm of the courts to review the internal management
of prison systems. 6 Application of the "hands-off" doctrine today is
determined by whether the petitioners' claims show deprivation of a
7
constitutional right.
Recognition that prisoners have constitutional rights is a departure
from early judicial thinking. A prisoner was once regarded as a "slave
of the state." 8 While prisoners have always had the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment, 9 the affirmative rights of freedom
of religion, 10 of association," and of free access to the courts12 have
received only relatively recent confirmation by the courts.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-The Eighth Amendment
The showing by a prisoner that his treatment by prison officials
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment has always been a circum442 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5 For cases applying the "hands-off" doctrine, see Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1952); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951); Sturn v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472, 473 (10th Cir.
1949).
6 This is the result of construction of 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970), which gives the attorney
general the responsibility for federal prison administration.
7 Cf. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
8 Ruflin v. Virginia, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
9 See, e.g., In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599, 600 (S.D. Ga. 1889).
10 Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
11Cf. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971). It should be pointed out
that freedom of association in prisons is usually tied to freedom of religion or allegations
of cruel and unusual punishment. In denying a religious sect the opportunity to gather for
services, for example, prison officials are open to attack on the constitutional issues of
denial of freedom of religion or freedom of association. The former method is most often
used since it is more difficult for prison officials to show compelling reasons why inmates
should not be allowed to congregate. See Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The question of the propriety of punitive isolation is also one of freedom of association,
but generally it is attacked on the grounds of cruel and unusual punishment. See Jordan
v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
12 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969).
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stance justifying refusal to adhere to the "hands-off" doctrine. 1 Erosion
of the "hands-off" doctrine in this context is dependent upon judicial
definition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court
adopted a 'narrow view in early decisions. In the case of In re Kemmler,14 decided in 1890, the Supreme Court declared that cruel and
*unusual punishment as used in the Constitution implies "something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."'15 The problem of defining exactly what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment has not been solved with the passing of years.
In 1957, the Supreme Court decided Trop v. Dulles0 and cast additional light on the question.
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual"
has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic policy reflected
in these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice. .

.

. The basic concept underlying the

Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to
assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending on the enormity of the crime, but any technique
outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect .... [T]he words of the Amendment are not precise, and
...their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving1 standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society. "
13 As early as 1889 a federal district court held that charges of inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment will require judicial review. In the case of In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599
(S.D. Ga. 1889), the prisoner was chained by the neck to the grating of -a cell and left
standing in that position for several hours. As to the propriety of this type of discipline,
Judge Speer remarked:
The arbitrary power in a prison-keeper to iron a prisoner, or indeed, to select at
his pleasure a penalty which he thinks adequate as a disciplinary measure for real or
-fancied misconduct, is intolerable among a free and enlightened people. It has no
place among English-speaking nations.
Id. at 600.
14 136 U.S. 436, 10 S. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1890).
15 Id. at 447, 10 S. Ct. at 933, 34 L. Ed. at 524.
18 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958).
17 Id. at 99-101, 78 S. Ct. at 597-98, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 642 (emphasis added); see Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378, 30 S. Ct. 544, 553, 54 L. Ed. 793, 803 (1910), where the
-Court said that a definition of cruel and unusual punishment "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice." In one case, the fact that cruel and unusual punishment is a relative term which
changes with the times worked to the detriment of the prisoners. In Ex parte Pickens, 101
F. Supp.*285 (D. Alas. 1951) the petitioner was one of 40 inmates in a jail which housed all
of the inmates in a room of about 27 square feet. Most of the space was occupied by
bunks, tables, and benches. There were no recreational facilities. Sixteen-year-old prisoners
were housed with hardened criminals. There was no separate facility for mentally ill
prisoners. The jail physician testified to the unsanitary conditions of the jail due to lack of
ventilation and inadequate toilet facilities. There was an ever present danger of fire, as the
room was heated by an ancient coal stove. Furthermore, there was only one exit and it was
locked to prevent the escape of the prisoners. The court recognized that the jail was unfit
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Since the finding of cruel and unusual punishment in particular circumstances is one avenue available to the prisoner to obtain'a hearing- in
a federal court, definition of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is extremely important. The avenue has not always been available
to state prisoners. It has only been since the 1962 Supreme Court decision of Robinson v. California,"' where the Court decided that the
eighth amendment was to be applied to the states, that a showing of
cruel and unusual punishment by a state prisoner entitled him to a
hearing in a federal court.
Determination of whether particular disciplinary actions amount to
cruel and unusual punishment cannot be effected in a vacuum. The
punishment must be weighed against the offense. If there is a large,
disparity between the punishment and the severity of the offense, there
may be a finding of cruel and unusual punishment, though the punishment considered alone does not shock the conscience. 19 In Wright v.
McMann,'20 the petitioner had been placed in segregation for failure to
sign a "safety sheet." After spending 5 months in segregation, the
petitioner was released, again refused to sign, and was sent back to
segregation for an indeterminate period. The regulation which required prisoners to sign the "safety sheet" was meant to be a method
to insure that prisoners read the safety rules before working in the
prison shops. The petitioner sincerely believed that the sheet was a
waiver of his right to sue the state of New York for injuries caused
by negligence. The court found that his punishment was so disproportionate to his offense as to amount
to a deprivation of his eighth and
21
rights.
amendment
fourteenth
for human habitation, but failed to find cruel and unusual punishment. The court made
reference to the relative nature of cruel and unusual punishment and continued:
After all, the "cruel and inhuman punishment" suffered by the petitioner and others
in the Anchorage jail, although rightly to be deplored and condemned by al people
with humane instincts, is scarcely deserving of the name when compared with the
danger and misery and "cruel and inhuman" circumstances under which our own
soldiers and other troops of the United Nations now in action in Korea live-and die
-where they are now not only compelled to lie or move about in the mud and slush
and snow and frost for hours or even days on end .. . but exposed to the hazards of
being shot and bombed, killed or maimed ... . The question may well be asked why
men in Anchorage, Alaska, accused of serious crime, even when imprisoned under the
the conditions described, should be now discharged from imprisonment . . . when
others of our citizens . . .engaged in the defense of all of the people of our nationincluding those now confined in the Anchorage jail-are . . . undergoing hazards a
thousand times as great and suffering "cruel and inhuman punishment" far more,
terrible than that to which the petitioner and his fellow prisoners in the Anchorage
jail are exposed.
Id. at 289-90. The reasoning of this court does not appear to have been applied in subsequent cases.
18 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962).
19 Whether or not a particular act or circumstance shocks the conscience is another
method of determining whether treatment is unconstitutional. See Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190 (1952).
20 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
21 Id. at 145; accord, Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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Cruel and unusual punishment continues to be an evasive term, but
inroads have been made. 22 A flexible standard has been attached which
allows for a continuously expanding definition. The fact that punishment will be considered in light of the offense indicates that all
circumstances will be considered. 28 In this connection, federal courts
should bear in mind that what may seem like a small privilege to
society at large, amounts to a vital concern to the prisoner.
The "Preferred" Freedoms-The First Amendment
While the burden of showing disproportionate punishment in light
of the offense is on the petitioner in alleging denial of his eighth amendment rights,2 4 a different situation exists where a "preferred" constitutional right is involved. If a first amendment right is at issue, the
burden of proof shifts from the individual petitioner to the prison
officials. The courts presume that a prisoner has a right to freedom of
religion, 25 access to the courts,26 and freedom to petition for redress
of grievances.27 Where a prisoner asserts that one of these rights has,
been denied him, prison officials must meet a two-pronged test in order
to justify denial of the right. First, it is incumbent upon officials to
show that the right was denied to effect a "compelling state interest."
In both the areas of racial classification and discrimination and
First Amendment freedoms, we have pointed out that the stringent
standards are to be applied to governmental restrictions in these
areas, and rigid scrutiny must be brought to bear on the justifications for encroachments on such rights. The State must strongly
Show some substantial and controlling interest which requires the
subordination or limitation of these important constitutional
rights, and which justifies their infringement, and in absence of
such compelling justification the state restrictions are impermis28
sible infringements of these fundamental and preferred rights.
22 For instances where cruel and unusual punishment has been found, see Jones v.
Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa.
1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
28 See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972). In that case, while finding that the
petitioner had met the burden of showing a disproportionate punishment, the court expressed that the burden is a heavy one.
Ordinarily we would be most reluctant to find unconstitutionally disproportionate
the use of segregated confinement as punishment. Prison officials, not federal judges,
are in day to day proximity or contact with the inmates and are consequently better
able to determine what punishment might or might not be appropriate to a particular

offense committed by a particular inmate. . . . In short, the inmate alleging disproportionate punishment will ordinarily have a heavy burden.
Id. at 132.
24 Id. at 132.

See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969).
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
25
26
27
28
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The second requirement is that, after showing that there is a compelling state interest to observe, prison officials must then show that
the only way to effect this interest is necessarily by denial of the constitutional right.2 9 Thus, if another method is available which leaves the
constitutional right intact, then that method must be employed. For
example, prison officials would easily be able to show that keeping
contraband out of the prisons is a compelling state interest. This, however, would not justify a prison regulation which prohibits the prisoners
from receiving any incoming mail.8 0 A more limited method, one
which least restricts the prisoners' rights while also paying due homage
to the substantial state interest, is to examine incoming mail before
distributing it to the prisoners. By this procedure, the individual's
rights are subjected to minimum infringement.8 1 This "minimum
restrictions" rule has not received universal recognition by the federal
courts considering prisoner complaints. The rule has been applied
to other groups whose rights were considered necessarily subservient
to the overall state interest. Thus, the rule is being asserted by prisoners
analogizing their positions to those of students, 2 mental hospital patients,8 8 and government employees, 8 4 all of whom have recently challenged the restrictions on their constitutional rights.8 5 In Shelton v.
Tucker,86 the issue was the constitutionality of a statute requiring
teachers to annually file an affidavit listing organizations to which they
have belonged or contributed to within the last five years. The Court
invoked the "minimum restrictions" rule in holding the statute unconstitutional and recognized that the test was to be applied in any one
of several situations involving infringement of constitutional rights.
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental7
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The rule has now been expressly applied to prisoners. In Barnett v.
29

Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).

80 Regulations concerning prisoners' mail have themselves been the subject of several

constitutional claims. See Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971). Many of the problems with mail censorship are inextricably related to denial of petitioner's free access to the courts. See Evans v. Moseley,
455 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1972); LeVier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Burns v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1971).
81 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968).
82 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 St. Ct. 733, 21
L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969).
83 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
34 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967).
85 See South Carolina Dep't. of Corrections, The Emerging Rights of the Confined 28
(1972).
86 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960).
87 Id. at 488, 81 S.Ct. at 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 237.
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Rogers,88 -the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
suggested that, as a practical matter, in dealing with prison regulations
the government would probably have a better chance in justifying a
curtailment even of the "preferred" freedoms. The court expressly
pointed out, however, that this does not relieve prison officials of the
responsibility to convincingly show that they have reduced the impact
of the denial "to the fullest extent consistent with the justified objective."39
It can be seen that even when dealing with fundamental "preferred"
freedoms, the guidelines available to the courts are couched in vagueness and uncertainty. As was pointed out in relation to eighth amendmentrights, the problem becomes one of defining the terms upon which
the tests are based. The probability that a prisoner will be granted
relief in a particular set of circumstances, then, is largely dependent on
the court's definition of "compelling state interest" and "minimum
40
restrictions."
The attempt to assign a meaningful definition to these terms has
resulted in application of the "clear and present danger test.' '4 This
test requires prison officials to show that denial of the "preferred"
freedom was essential in view of the "clear and present danger" which
would result in absence of the denial. The test seems to have been first
enunciated by Justice Holmes in 1919 in the decision of Schenck v.
United States.42 The "clear and present danger" criterion has only
38 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
391d. at 1000.
40 This limitation can be attributed to the fact that the law in this area is barely beyond
conception. As more decisions regarding prisoners' rights are handed down, the opportunity for drawing on the reasoning of other courts will be better presented. Perhaps the
end result will be the emergence of a definite pattern which will provide guidance in
deciding future claims. The courts are examining decisions rendered under like facts and
circumstances that are presently available. The experiences of prisons in granting a right
which has been denied prisoners in other prisons "should have substantial probative value
on the question of the state interests in forbidding access." Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d
.1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
41 Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971). This case contains a good review of the "clear
and present danger" test.
42 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919). Involved here was the question of
whether the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, infringed upon
the rights of freedom of speech and press. The case has particular application to prisoners'
rights since the court recognized the fact that the country was at war causes different
standards to be applied in determining whether freedom of speech had been abridged.
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight
and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Id. at 52, 39 S. Ct. at 249, 63 L. Ed. at 474. Petitioner had been convicted of conspiracy to
cause insubordination in the military forces and obstruction of enlistment and recruiting.
The Court, then, seemed to have recognized the superiority of a compelling state interest
.
over individual constitutional rights. Still, the Court said:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
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recently been applied by federal courts when considering the constitutional claims of prisoners4 3 and it has not received universal acceptance.4 4 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was a leader
in applying the test to prisoners' claims, 45 but some confusion as to its
application remains. 46 It is clear that the test will be applied in cases
involving denial of religious freedom 47 and it seems certain that it will
be extended to other "preferred" freedoms.
The significance of the "clear and present danger" test is that it offers guidance in determining what is meant by a "compelling state
interest." Thus, it is not enough to show the existence of a compelling
state interest; there must be a showing of a clear and present danger
that jeopardizes that interest. While institutional security is definitely
a compelling state interest,48 a showing that the security is jeopardized
cannot be based on speculation and absent a showing of clear and
present danger, constitutional restrictions cannot be justified. Thus,
the "clear and present danger" test must be utilized to determine if a,
compelling state interest is even at stake. The test seems to indicate
that while showing the existence of a compelling state interest may be
relatively easy, the additional burden of showing that the interest
is jeopardized will be a heavy one.
REMEDIES
When a prisoner challenges the constitutionality of some aspect of
his incarceration, the method by which he invokes the jurisdiction of
Id. at 52, 39 S. Ct. at 249, 63 L. Ed. at 473 (emphasis added). Thus, the test seems to have
arisen out of a circumstance closely analogous to prisoners' claims.
43 Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964) seems to have been the first time
the test was applied to prisoners' claims by a federal court. The court there held that mere
speculation that a riot will ensue from allowing muslim inmates to congregate does not
meet the "clear and present danger" test.
The probability of muslim-inspired future riots is speculative at best. . . . The
antipathy of the other inmates and the staff, occasioned by the muslim belief in
black supremacy, standing alone is not sufficient to justify the suppression of religious
freedom in the Youth Center; neither is the alleged disruptive effect on the rehabilitation program ....To justify the prohibition of the practice of an established religion
at the Youth Center the prison officials must prove by satisfactory evidence that the
teachings and practice of the sect create a clear and present danger to the orderly
functioning of the institution.
Id. at 30.
44 See Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir..
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971). In that case, the "clear and present danger" test
was applied to the prisoners' claim of denial of religious freedom. District Judge Higginbotham indicated, however, that he applied the test only because he was bound by the
precedent set by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d
816 (3d Cir. 1968). Judge Higginbotham took particular issue with the requirement of
"present" danger. His thinking is that this is too great a burden for prison officials to
have to bear. He advocates a test of clear and probable danger. Id. at 1056-57.
45 Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
46 See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967). The court there was unsure as
to whether the "clear and present danger" test was applicable but the language of the
decision indicates an implicit acceptance.
47 1d.
48 Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965).
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the federal court can have important bearing on whether relief is obtained. There are several remedies available which allow prisoners
to challenge the conditions of their confinement, but the two most
frequently resorted to are federal habeas corpus 49 and the Civil Rights

Act of 1871. 50 Both require that the petitioner's claim be of constitutional dimensions, 5' but there are procedural difficulties involved with
habeas corpus which are not encountered by petitioning for relief
under the Civil Rights Act.
Habeas Corpus-The Custody and Exhaustion Obstacles
Federal habeas corpus has undergone substantial change since its
earliest applications, 52 most of which has occurred in recent years. In
general, the trend has been to expand the type of relief cognizable
under habeas corpus. This expansion has been effectuated by a gradual
relaxing of the formerly strict requirements of custody and exhaustion
of available state remedies.
The requirement that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus be
in custody has undergone the most drastic change. 53 In its earliest
applications, custody required that the petitioner be actually physically
restrained.5 4 In line with this definition of custody it was held that a
prisoner released on parole may not seek the writ.55 Similar reasoning
49 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
50 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
51 This is not entirely accurate. The Civil Rights Act provides relief for denial of federal
statutory rights as well as constitutional rights, but, as a practical matter, there are very
few statutory rights which a prisoner can assert.
52 Habeas corpus came into existence in the United States with the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. The writ had only very limited application
when first considered by the Supreme Court. Relief was authorized only if the court that
ordered the confinement had no jurisdiction. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 5
L. Ed. 391 (1822). Jurisdiction in habeas cases began to assume new outer boundaries in
1867 when federal courts were given the power to hear habeas petitions of state prisoners.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970) (originally enacted Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat.
385). The value of this extension was reduced by the fact that the same restrictive test in
determining whether relief should be granted was still applied. If a state prisoner had
been confined by a court of competent jurisdiction, habeas did not lie to grant relief. In re
Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 11 S. Ct. 191, 34 L. Ed. 796 (1891).
58The statutory provision that a prisoner be in custody to seek relief under habeas

corpus is 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970).

54 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 5 S. Ct. 1050, 29 L. Ed. 277 (1885). Here the petitioner
had been Surgeon General of the Navy. He was being accused of dereliction of duty and
the Secretary of the Navy sent him a letter placing him under arrest and ordering his
confinement within the limits of the city of Washington, D. C. The Court's decision in
denying the writ is based on the lack of physical restraint. Id. at 569, 5 S. Ct. at 1053, 29
L. Ed. at 278. The case contains a complete discussion of the custody requirement and
points out problems, present even today, in determining when a person is in custody. Id.
at 571-72, 5 S. Ct. at 1053-54, 29 L. Ed. at 279. It is interesting to note that English law
applied a much less restrictive definition of custody. For example, in 1722 it was held that
habeas was an appropriate remedy for a woman who was kept from seeing her husband
when she wished; the test there applied was only whether she was free to go where she
pleased. Rex v. Clarkson, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B. 1722).
55 Weber v. Squier, 124 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (writ
of certiorari denied as moot since petitioner had been placed on probation).
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has been applied to petitioners seeking relief while on probation. 56
The justification was that since the petitioner had been released, he
was not in custody and his petition was moot.5 7 The strictness of the
custody requirement was diluted in Jones v. Cunningham.58 The Supreme Court decided that a prisoner on parole may have lost his cause
of action against the superintendent of the penitentiary, but may have
a cause of action against the parole board. The prisoner's act of naming
the parole board as party respondent "squarely raises the question, not
presented in our earlier cases, of whether the Parole Board now holds
the petitioner in its 'custody' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241
so that he can by habeas corpus require the Parole Board to point to
and defend the law by which it justifies any restraint on his liberty."5 9
Justice Black then reviewed the usual conditions and restrictions imposed on a parolee and found that they amounted to significant
restraints within the purview of habeas corpus. 60 The early strict interpretation of the custody requirement was further relaxed in 1967 with
the Supreme Court decision of Carafas v. LaVallee.1 There the petitioner had served his sentence and been released from custody before
his application for a writ of habeas corpus had been fully adjudicated.
The respondent advanced the usual argument that the unconditional
release of a prisoner rendered moot a petition for habeas corpus since
the requirement of custody was not fulfilled. The Court overruled a
1960 decision 62 and held that because of the collateral consequences
of a criminal record, the petitioner has "a substantial stake in the
judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence
imposed on him. '6 3 Thus, judicial construction of "custody" advanced
from the requirement of actual physical restraint to the broad application enunciated in Carafas.
Consonant with the early requirement that a prisoner be physically
restrained to be in custody was the idea that habeas corpus was available
only when the relief sought was a total release from this restraint. This
was the position taken by the Supreme Court in 1934 with the decision
56 Viles v. United States, 193 F.2d 776 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952).

Weber v. Squier, 124 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 810 (1942).
58 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1963).
59 Id. at 241, 83 S. Ct. at 376, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 290.
60 It is still generally held, however, that a petitioner who is out on bail is not in
"custody" so as to enable him to seek relief under habeas corpus. See, e.g., Matysek v.
United States, 339 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 917 (1965).
61 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1968).
62 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L. Ed. 2d 963 (1960). This case expressly
held that a prisoner who had been released could not claim relief on a petition for habeas
corpus since release rendered his cause moot.
63 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 1559, 20 L. Ed. 2d 554, 558
(1968), quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 230, 91 L. Ed. 196,
203 (1946).
57
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of McNally v. Hill.6 4 There the petitioner had been convicted of three
separate counts on an indictment. The sentences for the first two counts
were to run concurrently, with the sentence on the third count to run
consecutively with the second. The petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus asserting the invalidity of the conviction on the third
count, but his application was filed while he was serving his sentence
on the second count and before the sentence on the third count had
begun to run. The Court decided that the writ would not issue since
even if the petitioner's claim was favorably recognized it could not
result in his immediate release. Since the sentence he was serving when
he filed for the writ was admittedly valid, he could not be released
until his third sentence began and if release could not be immediate,
habeas was not the proper remedy.6 5
The decision in McNally militated against claims which sought only
to challenge some condition of confinement where the remedy asked
was merely improvement in the conditions. 66 The Court based their
decision on application of the common law. 67 In approving the common
law use of the writ, the Court used language which was unequivocal in
effect.
The purpose of the proceeding defined by the statute was to
inquire into the legality of detention, discharge of the prisoner or
to bail, and that only if his detention were found
his admission
68
unlawful.

The inflexibility of the rule was mitigated somewhat with express
judicial recognition of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 which provides that a court
may "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 69 This provision was used by the Supreme Court in Dowd v. United States ex
rel. Cook 70 to avoid "the dilemma envisaged by the State of having
to choose between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner and
denying him all relief." 71 The confusion continued until 1967 when
64293 U.S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24, 79 L. Ed. 238 (1934).
65 Id. at 135, 55 S. Ct. at 26, 79 L. Ed. at 241.
66 Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952).
67 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24, 79 L. Ed. 238 (1934):
The statute [now 28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not define the term habeas corpus. To
ascertain its meaning and the appropriate use of the writ in the federal courts, recourse must be had to the common law, from which the term was drawn, and the
decisions of this Court interpreting and applying the common law principles which
define its use when authorized by the statute.
Id. at 136, 55 S. Ct. at 26, 79 L. Ed. at 241.
68 Id. at 136, 55 S. Ct. at 26, 79 L. Ed. at 242. See also Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329:U.S. 304, 315, 67 S. Ct. 313, 319, 91 L. Ed. 308, 314 (1946).
The function of habeas corpus is not to correct a practice but only to ascertain
whether the procedure complained of has resulted in an unlawful detention.
69 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
70 340 U.S. 206, 71 S. Ct. 262, 95 L. Ed. 215 (1951).
71Id. at 209, 71 S. Ct. at 264, 95 L. Ed. at 219.
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the Supreme Court decided Peyton v. Rowe 72 and expressly overruled
McNally. The Court found that the narrow limitations placed on
habeas corpus in McNally were inconsistent with the purposes of federal
habeas corpus and approved the finding of the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit 73 that McNally represented a "doctrinaire approach"
which had been based on jurisdictional concepts that had long since
been rejected. 74 The rejection of McNally ended a long period of
75
confusion as to when habeas would issue and when it would not.

The Peyton decision, however, was not the last step in abrogating
the "total release" rule. Two years after Peyton, the Supreme Court
decided Johnson v. Avery."8 The petitioner there was not seeking a
release from custody, but was contesting a prison regulation which
prohibited prisoners from offering legal aid to one another. The petitioner had been placed in a maximum security unit for violating this
regulation. The Court allowed the use of the writ to challenge this
7
one aspect of confinement and found the regulation unconstitutional.
Since Johnson, it has generally been held that habeas corpus is not
restricted to those who ask to be released from custody, but is presently
available to challenge conditions of confinement alleged to be illegal. 7
Johnson, even more than Peyton, represents a radical departure from
early judicial applications of habeas corpus. The use of the writ was
more traditional in Peyton since the challenge was to the judicial sentence. Johnson, however, allowed use of the writ to supervise prison
administration. 9
The custody requirement, then, is still very much in existence"
but the former strict interpretation of custody has been ameliorated
to the extent that it no longer presents an almost insuperable barrier
to those who challenge merely the conditions of confinement. A second
72 391 U.S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 1549, 20 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1968).
73 Peyton v. Rowe, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1968).
74 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1549, 1551, 20 L. Ed. 2d 426, 429 (1968).
75 As early as 1894 the Supreme Court decision of In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct.
323, 38 L. Ed. 149 (1894), had held that a prisoner unlawfully detained in one place could
use the writ to challenge his detention, although he would not be granted an immediate
release. He would still be subject to the right of the government to lawfully detain him
in the proper place. The seeming inconsistency between McNally and Bonnet has caused
the courts some confusion; generally the McNally decision has been followed.
76 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969).
77 Johnson does not, by any means, represent the first time that habeas was successfully
used. As early as 1944, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allowed a prisoner to
use habeas to challenge one aspect of his lawful custody. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). "A prisoner is entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus when, though lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to which he
is lawfully entitled even in his confinement." Id. at 445. But see Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d
718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944).
78 Mead v. Parker, -

F.2d -,

-

(9th Cir. 1972).

79 For a complete historical development of the custody requirement see Developments
in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAtv. L. Rav. 1038, 1072-93 (1970).
80 See, e.g., Glazier v. Hackel, 440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971).
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major obstacle to relief through habeas has also undergone recent
change. This is the requirement that a petitioner for federal habeas
corpus must fully exhaust available state remedies before seeking relief
in federal courts.8 '
The requirement seems to have been born of an early recognition of
potential conflict between state and federal courts. The possibility for
conflict in habeas jurisdiction arose in 1867 when habeas corpus was
made available to state prisoners by act of Congress.8 2 It was to resolve
this possible conflict that the exhaustion requirement was instituted.
The requirement is founded on the principle of comity between courts,
"a doctrine which teaches us that one court should defer action on
causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another
sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the
litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter. 83 The
rule, then, is predicated only on the precepts of comity since it is not
a matter of jurisdictional power.8 4 "The rule is not one defining power
but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power."' 5
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Allen"6 and the stringency of the exhaustion requirement was partially relaxed There the
Court squarely held that when a prisoner has once asserted his constitutional claim in state courts, he has effectively exhausted the available state remedies. He was not required to go back to the' state courts
and pursue a collateralremedy based on the same evidence and raising
the same issues. The decision also provided that it was within the
discretion of the federal district judge whether to hear evidence and
argument on federal constitutional issues presented or to rely strictly
on the state court findings.8 7 In excluding collateral remedies, Brown
served to restrict the meaning of the term "remedies available in. the
88
courts of the State."
The next major step taken concerning exhaustion of state remedies
* 81 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970).

82 Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. See Comment, The Relationship of
State and Lower Federal Courts in Criminal Constitutional Litigation, 3 ST. MARY'S L.J.
249, 259-63 (1971).
88 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L. Ed. 761, 767 (1950).
84 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420, 83 S. Ct. 822, 839, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837, 858 (1963); Baldwin
v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 32 (7th Cir. 1971). That the exhaustion requirement is grounded on
federal policy rather than federal power can also be inferred from that fact that if a petitioner presents an obviously meritless claim to a federal court under habeas without first
having exhausted his state remedies, the court will disregard the exhaustion requirement
and simply deny relief. This is done on the basis that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) confers jurisdiction on federal courts to hear habeas cases, while the limitation requiring exhaustion in
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) is merely a matter of national policy. In re Ernst's Petition, 294
F.2d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 1961).
85 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27, 59 S. Ct. 442, 446, 83 L. Ed. 455, 459. (1939).
86 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L. Ed. 469 (1953).
87 Id. at 463-64, 73 S.Ct. at 410-11, 97 L. Ed. at 492.
88 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970).
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was in 1963 with the decision of Townsend v. Sain.8 9 The Court held
there that the federal courts "must hold an evidentiary hearing if the
habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in
a state court." 90 Thus, to the extent that Brown allowed for discretion
to the trial court in this matter, that decision was overruled. 91 The
Townsend decision is important in that it insures that the petitioner
may have his cause relitigated if there has not been a full, reliable
finding of fact in the state court. 2 While the decision does not actually
diminish the need to exhaust available remedies, it does insure that
summary disposition will not be made of the case by a federal court
on the basis that all the facts were determined at the state level.
Fay v. Noia,93 decided the same day as Townsend, was the most
important decision on the exhaustion requirement. The petitioner
and two co-defendants had been convicted in a New York state court
of murder. The two co-defendants appealed alleging that their convictions were based on coerced confessions. The trial court judgment
was affirmed but their convictions were set aside in a post-conviction
proceeding. Noia had not appealed his conviction. After 14 years he
applied for relief in the state courts but was barred for failing to appeal
his conviction. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The court expressed concern over the apparent denial of his
fourteenth amendment rights, but felt bound by the exhaustion rule
to deny the writ. The Supreme Court determined that the writ should
have been granted. The Court held that the exhaustion requirement
meant that a petitioner must exhaust state remedies available at the
time he applies for the writ. A contrary holding would bar access to
the federal courts to a petitioner who had a valid federal constitutional
claim simply because he committed a procedural default. "In what sense
is Noia's custody not in violation of federal law simply because New
York will not allow him to challenge it on coram nobis or on delayed
appeal?"9 4 The Court recognized the conceptual possibility that petitioners would deliberately bypass state procedures to get into federal
court on habeas corpus. The Court decided that the district judge
89 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963).
9O Id. at 312, 83 S. Ct. at 757, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 785 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 312, 83 S. Ct. at 757, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 785.
92 We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were
not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state
trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313, 83 S. Ct. at 757, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 786.
93 372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963).
94 Id. at 428, 83 S. Ct. at 843, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 862.
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should exercise discretion and deny relief to those he determined had
deliberately bypassed state court remedies.9 5
The exhaustion requirement is still an essential prerequisite to a
state prisoner attempting to gain access to federal court. The decisions
of Brown, Townsend, and Noia, however, have mitigated the former
stringency of the rule to the extent that a state prisoner no longer faces
what often was a substantial barrier to the federal courts. Furthermore,
if a federal court does deny the petitioner a hearing, it is because of a
finding that the state court disposition was clearly correct.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871-Section 1983
In order to state a cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 the petitioner must allege that the defendants acted
under color of state law and that they deprived the petitioner of a
constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity. 9 Since every
aspect of a prisoner's life is controlled by state officials, a prisoner will
97
have little difficulty satisfying the "under color of state law" test

and can concentrate on showing deprivation of a constitutional right.
Since an action brought under section 1983 does not require exhaustion
of state remedies, it has become the most popular method of seeking
relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions and regulations.98
In its earliest applications, however, the courts held that an action
brought under the Civil Rights Act did require exhaustion of available
state administrative and judicial remedies.9 9 The first major breakthrough came in 1961 in Pierce v. LaVallee'0 0 where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed a prisoner who alleged denial of
95 Id. at 438, 83 S. Ct. at 848, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 869.
96 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
97 "Under color of state law" has been defined as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law ...." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L. Ed.
1368, 1383 (1941). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-13, 65 S. Ct. 1031,
1038-41, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 1506-09 (1945).
8 The 1971 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States' Courts reflect that civil rights suits from 1968 to 1971 have increased 170 per cent
while, in the same period, habeas corpus petitions have increased only 30 per cent. See
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion). Section 1983
has been used for several purposes. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (cruel
and unusual punishment); Hirons v. Director, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (denial of religious freedom); Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (release from solitary confinement).
99 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1957).
100 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
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religious freedom to bring his action in federal court without making
initial application to the state processes. The court concentrated on the
fact that a "preferred" constitutional freedom was at stake and, as such,
the case was "quite distinguishable" from those where the prisoner
was alleging physical abuse. 1 1 Thus, the court implied that this was
not a matter of prison discipline which concededly was the province of
prison authorities.
The Supreme Court also considered the question in 1961 with the
case of Monroe v. Pape.10 2 After a detailed review of the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act, the Court found that the very reason
for its enactment was because of the inability or outright refusal of
state courts to provide relief in many cases involving constitutional
rights even though relief was warranted. In holding that the exhaustion
rule was never meant to have any application to actions brought under
the Civil Rights Act, the Court made the now famous statement:
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
be first sought and refused before the federal
the latter need 0not
3
one is invoked.

Since Monroe did not deal specifically with prisoner complaints
there was some confusion among federal courts as to whether prisoners
10 4
were still required to exhaust state and administrative remedies.
In 1963, the Supreme Court ended the dispute with the decision of
Houghton v. Shafer,10 5 where it was specifically held that the decision
in Monroe was to be applied to state prisoner suits brought under the
Civil Rights Act. Thus, it would seem that any problem federal courts
had with application of the exhaustion rule had been indisputably
solved. As will be seen, however, such was not the case.
HABEAS

CORPUS OR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
"THE RECURRENT RIDDLE"

ACT?-

The decisions expanding the availability of federal habeas corpus to
state prisoners have created a unique situation: the remedies of federal
101 Id. at 235.
102 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961). There Chicago police officers had
broken into the petitioner's home without a warrant for arrest or search and forced the
petitioner and his family to stand naked in the living room while they ransacked the
house. They then took the petitioner to the police station and subjected him to 10 hours
of questioning about a 2-day-old murder before finally releasing him without being
charged.
103 Id. at 183, 81 S. Ct. at 482, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 503.
104 Compare Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F.2d 169, 172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963)
[andl United States ex ret. Oakes v. Taylor, 269 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (exhaustion is
required) with Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 1966) [and] Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (exhaustion not required).
105 392 U.S. 639, 88 S. Ct. 2119, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1319 (1968).
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habeas corpus and the Civil Rights Act are becoming somewhat interchangeable. The basis of the similarity is the fact that both remedies
require that the prisoner assert deprivation of a constitutional right. 10 6
Since Johnson v. Avery 1°7 habeas corpus has been a proper remedy for
a prisoner who alleges that the conditions of his confinement are
unconstitutional. Habeas corpus, as has been shown, requires that the
state prisoner initially resort to state judicial processes before he can
be granted a hearing in a federal tribunal. 10 8 Section 1983, on the
other hand, does not require exhaustion of state remedies, 10 9 but is
also available to challenge conditions of confinement. Thus, there exists
a large, overlapping area where prisoners' claims are cognizable under
both remedies. The essential difference of the exhaustion requirement
has caused confusion among federal judges which is only now being
resolved. Judge Doyle aptly labelled the ensuing problem as the "recurrent riddle." 110
In spite of the similar characteristics shared by habeas corpus and
section 1983, basic differences do remain. There are certain prisoner
complaints which call for clear application of one remedy to the exclusion of the other. Habeas corpus is clearly the proper remedy for a
prisoner who alleges that his conviction and sentence were in violation
of his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that allegations
that the petitioner was denied counsel at his parole revocation hearing,"' or subjected to a warrantless search, 112 or denied due process
in summary court-martial proceedings"11 are cognizable under habeas,
and relief cannot be granted under section 1983. Disposition of these
claims in favor of the petitioner would result in his release, and since
release from prison is not provided for under section 1983, the peculiar
applicability of habeas is clear. 1 4 On the other hand, if the prisoner is
seeking an award of damages, filing under section 1983 is the proper
procedure, 1115 although a few courts have applied habeas to prisoners'
damage suits and dismissed their claims for failure to exhaust state
remedies.

16

10628 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
107 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1 69).
108 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1970).
109 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1972); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S. Ct. 2119, 20 L. Ed..2d 1319 (1968); Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416, 88 S. Ct. 526, 19 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5
L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
110 Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 69 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
1I Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969).
112 Martin v. Roach, 280 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Johnson v. Walker, 317
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963).
113 Miller v. Rockefeller, 327 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
114 E.g., King v. Rouse, 316 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Va. 1970).
115 Kalec v. Adamowski, 406 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1969).
116 E.g., Smith v. Logan, 311 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Va. 1970).
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The areas where application of one remedy or the other is clear
have caused federal courts few problems. It is the claims cognizable
under both remedies, those challenging the conditions of confinement,
that have bred confusion. The problem centers on the fact that section
1983 does not require exhaustion of available state remedies. Thus,
a prisoner who wants an initial hearing in a federal forum could seemingly elect the procedurally advantageous remedy of section 1983 and
not have to worry about exhaustion. Since this would be the obvious
course of action, some federal judges have been concerned that the
final result will be to effectively repeal the exhaustion requirement of
habeas corpus. 1 7 The attempt to insure the continuing vitality of the
exhaustion requirement has resulted in what has been denominated
the "circumvention rule:" 118 Section 1983 may not be used by the state
prisoner to circumvent the established rules of comity and the requirement that state remedies be first exhausted before resort can be had
to a federal forum. x9 In short, section 1983 may not be used in cases
which call for application of habeas corpus only. The "circumvention
rule" is clearly applicable to section 1983 petitions which, in essence,
actually contest the legality of conviction and sentence, 20 but it ap2
pears to have been applied too broadly.' '
Since Monroe and Houghton, it has been clear that the exhaustion
rule has no application to the Civil Rights Act. Many federal judges,
however, feel that this is an infringement upon the basic precepts of
comity which denies the state court the right to litigate federal constitutional claims and provide state relief where warranted. Furthermore,
it has the effect of overburdening federal courts. One method which
has been employed to avoid this has been to simply designate a prisoner's
section 1983 claim as one cognizable under federal habeas corpus and
require the prisoner to seek his relief through state judicial processes.
Therefore, despite the broad substantive language of the civil
rights statutes, they should be interpreted with an eye to their history and with an awareness that they are not the only available
means by which persons alleged to have suffered deprivation of
their rights may seek redress.
• . .The civil rights provisions should be construed so as to
respect the proper balance between the federal and state law en117 See, e.g., Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
118 Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68, 70 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
119 Smart v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969); Greene v. New York, 281 F. Supp. 579
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
120 E.g., Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418
(5th Cir. 1963); Martin v. Roach, 280 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
121 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 456
F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor., Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 711369); United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on
rehearingsub nom., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor.,
Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 71-1369).
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forcement systems and should not be used in a manner 22calculated
to centralize adjudicative power in the federal courts.

United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis123 is an example of the
reluctance of some federal courts to allow prisoners to have their initial
hearing in a federal tribunal. There the petitioner brought a section
1983 action in federal district court alleging unconstitutional deprivation of 50 days good time credit. A diary had been found in the possession of the petitioner in which he had made crude remarks about
the Deputy Commissioner. The federal district court held that there
was no prison regulation against keeping a private diary and that the
prisoner had been denied due process, equal protection of the law, and
freedom of thought. The court ordered full restoration of good time
credit which resulted in the prisoner's release. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed holding that the appellee was seeking
release from custody and therefore his section 1983 petition was in
reality a habeas corpus petition. The court then dismissed the cause
for failure to exhaust state remedies. In fact, the petitioner was not
seeking release from prison, but only restoration of good time credit
of which he had been unconstitutionally deprived. That restoration
of the time happened to complete his sentence and result in his release
was only an incident to his claim. The dissent stated the better view:
To make the availability of this remedy turn on the fortuitousness
of the prisoner's timing in filing his section 1983 claim makes no
sense in terms of either logic or judicial efficiency.
A civil rights plaintiff is entitled to choose a federal forum. If
relief such as restoration of good time earned has the incidental
effect of entitling him
to immediate release, it should not deprive
24
him of that choice.
The "circumvention rule," then, seems to have been applied too
broadly. The idea that a petition cannot be brought under section
1983 if habeas is appropriate is undoubtedly proper. The rule, however,
should apply only to those circumstances where habeas is peculiarly
applicable in its traditional use, and not where section 1983 is also
proper. To construe the rule otherwise results in the untenable position that the Civil Rights Act does indeed require exhaustion of available state remedies. It seems to be an indirect method of requiring
what the Supreme Court has directly held is not required.
The "recurrent riddle" was very much in existence when Daniel
Greene v. New York, 281 F. Supp. 579, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearingsub nom., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456
F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Oswald V. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 711369).
124 Id. at 560 (dissenting opinion).
122
123
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Wilwording and four other prisoners filed applications for writs of
habeas corpus in federal district court. They had resorted initially
to the state courts but their applications were dismissed for failure to
state grounds upon which relief could be granted. They alleged physical
mistreatment by prison employees and that the facilities in the maximum security unit in which they were confined were inadequate and
more restrictive than necessary for the maintenance of prison discipline.
The federal district court dismissed their petitions. 1 25 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the recent tendency
to construe prisoners' petitions flexibly, but held the prisoners to the
strict letter of the exhaustion rule under habeas and affirmed the trial
court's decision. The court held that to the extent that the prisoners
sought equitable relief cognizable in habeas corpus, they must return
to the state courts to exhaust the remedies of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, or any other possible method of relief. 126 The Supreme
Court reversed. 127 The Court held that the petitioners had sufficiently
exhausted state remedies. The mere possibility that the prisoner may
get relief in additional state proceedings does not bar federal relief. The
real significance of the decision, however, is the Court's holding that
although the relief sought was cognizable under habeas corpus, the
remedy of the Civil Rights Act was also available.

Petitioners were therefore entitled to have their actions treated
as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject, on the
basis of their allegations, to exhaustion requirements. 12
The effect of Wilwording, then, was to point out that where either
remedy is applicable, it is not within the discretionary power 129 of the
federal courts to style the petition as one under habeas corpus.
Indeed, the sua sponte construction by the Supreme Court of
Wilwording's petition as a complaint under section 1983 clearly
articulatesthat state prisonersalleging deprivationof constitutional
rights by prison officials are not forced to mold their claim for relief
in the form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.130
Wilwording v. Swenson, 331 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971).
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1971).
Id. at -, 92 St. Ct. at 409, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 421 (emphasis added).
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion) (emphasis
added), cert. granted sub noma., Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972) (No. 71-1369).
I would add that prior to Wilwording v. Swenson, my view was that even though
there might be cases where a state prisoner's complaint, purportedly brought pursuant to § 1983, could not be treated as a petition for habeas corpus, a federal court,
upon its finding that a prisoner was seeking equitable relief and was afforded an
adequate state court remedy (as here), had the discretionary power as a court of equity
to defer action pending the prisoner's application to the state court for relief.
Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 83 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). Consider also the remarks of Chief
Judge Friendly:
125
126
127
128
129
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The decision in Wilwording would seem to have solved the "recurrent riddle." The opinion has already been advanced, however, that
Wilwording can be distinguished from other section 1983 petitions
where relief is also cognizable in habeas corpus.13 ' Any lingering doubt
may soon be dissipated. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
determine the issue again, and this time the question is presented in
a manner which should leave little room for interpretation: Should
state prisoners have the option of challenging conditions of confinement
by means of the Civil Rights Act despite the purported existence of
an appropriate remedy by means of habeas corpus? 3 2
This question seems to be little more than a restatement of an issue
which the Court has decided five times before.133 In essence, it asks
whether state prisoners should be allowed to seek initial relief in federal
court, without regard to state remedies, when that relief is sought
through the Civil Rights Act. The "circumvention rule" prohibits
state prisoners from circumventing the requirements of habeas corpus
by use of section 1983 when the relief sought is traditionally and
peculiarly cognizable under habeas corpus. The issue to come before
the Court seems to be an inverse application of this rule: May federal
courts be allowed to circumvent the advantages of the Civil Rights Act
by requiring a petitioner to seek his relief, though cognizable under
section 1983, through federal habeas corpus? No sound explanation
has ever been offered as to why the availability of federal habeas corpus
precludes the availability of section 1983. There does not seem to be
anything inherent in either remedy which would support the concept
that one is superior.
Quoting from Wilwording, "[s]tate prisoners are not held to any
u 4
stricter standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs."'
This is sound law. The tests for determining whether a prisoner has
been denied a constitutional right, discussed earlier, take into consideration the unique factors of the prisoner's situation such as the need for
maintenance of prison order. Once the tests have been applied with
these unique factors considered and a finding has been made that in
[I] do not understand how a state prisoner who is entitled to relief by habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can opt out of that section, with its attendant requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies when these are available, simply by styling his petition
as one under the Civil Rights Act. But Wilwording seems to indicate that he can.
Id. at 81.
131 Id. at 85 (dissenting opinion).
182 Id.
183 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1972); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S. Ct. 2119, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1319 (1968); Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 83 S. Ct. 1433, 10 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5
L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
134 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 US. 249, -, 92 S. Ct. 407, 409, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418, 422
(1972).
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view of all of this, the prisoner is entitled to relief, then the prisoner
should be considered on an equal basis with other civil rights plaintiffs.
In short, the prisoner may have a heavier burden in proving that he
is entitled to relief, but upon so proving he stands before the court
as a person who has been denied a constitutional right. Requiring the
prisoner to utilize the remedy of habeas corpus when section 1983 is
equally available would result in holding state prisoners to a stricter
standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs. Thus, while
an ordinary citizen subjected to police brutality could seek initial
redress in federal court, the state prisoner who has been beaten by
guards would be required to style his petition as one seeking a writ
of habeas corpus and be forced to go first to the state courts. As one
judge has said:
But I cannot believe that federal jurisdiction in cases involving
prisoner rights is any more offensive to the state than federal jurisdictions in areas of police procedures for search, arrest, and detention, .

.

. education, .

.

. welfare . . . or public housing. I can

think of no reason why the question of prison administration
should be classified as one of greater or more peculiar
state concern
135
than the instances to which I have just referred.
The argument has been advanced that to allow a prisoner to style
his petition as a section 1983 claim will ultimately result in effective
repeal of section 2254 which requires exhaustion for habeas claims. 3 6
This argument seems to make the erroneous assumption that section
1983 can completely displace habeas corpus. Any claim that the prisoner's conviction or sentence is illegal, however, is cognizable under habeas corpus and not under section 1983. Thus, the traditional function
of habeas is completely preserved. Even if habeas corpus was never
again used by prisoners to challenge the conditions of their confinement, the end result would be to restore habeas to its pre-Johnson v.
Avery 137 status. The reason for extending the availability of habeas
corpus in Johnson was to grant the petitioner relief where it was clear
that he was entitled to it. Thus, Johnson, in the interest of protecting
constitutional rights, stretched habeas corpus to outer boundaries it
had never before reached. Since then, however, it has been recognized
that a statutory remedy exists to provide for the circumstances presented
in Johnson: Section 1983. In short, far from repealing the exhaustion
requirement of habeas corpus, the end result can be no more than to
restore it to its traditional function. One federal judge has recognized
135 Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
136 E.g., Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1963).
137 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969).
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that the Supreme Court in Wilwording implicitly rejected the "repeal
argument."
I find it difficult to believe that the Court, specifically confronted
with the alternative modes of pleading, overlooked or did not consider fully the interaction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and 42 U.S.C.

§

1983.138

There seems to be no legal basis for requiring a petitioner to label
his petition as one seeking a writ of habeas corpus when his claim is
cognizable under section 1983. The basis, rather, is one of policy; the
policy that state courts should have the initial opportunity to adjudicate
the prisoner's claim. The Supreme Court has held five times that this
policy has no application to claims under the Civil Rights Act. 13 9 The
question was narrowed each time it was presented for consideration
by the Court. Monroe, McNeese, and Damico held that exhaustion
was not required of civil rights plaintiffs generally while Houghton
specifically applied these holdings to state prisoners. Wilwording narrowed it still further by actually converting a habeas petition into a
section 1983 claim and holding that no exhaustion was required. The
question which has now been presented to the Court is narrowed even
further, but the fact remains that' it is essentially the same question.
The fact that federal courts, since Monroe, have attempted to find
a basis for requiring a prisoner filing a section 1983 claim to exhaust
state remedies reflects a strong belief in the basic precepts of comity.
It also reflects, however, the fact that the "hands-off" doctrine is not
yet history. While many federal courts have granted relief to prisoners
under section 1983 without regard to exhaustion, some judges have
been slow to accept the clear holdings of the Monroe line of cases, and
have attempted to bypass their effect by various means. As the "handsoff" doctrine slips out of the focus of modern ideology, federal courts
should not resort to fictions in an attempt to salvage it.
CONCLUSION

Prisoners undoubtedly occupy a special status in society. "Lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by considerations
underlying our penal system.' 140 This principle, advanced by the
188 Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion) (emphasis
added).
189 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1972); Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S. Ct. 2119, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1319 (1968); Damico v. California, 389
U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668,
83 S. Ct. 1433, 10 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.
2d 492 (1961).
140 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L. Ed. 1356, 1369 (1948).
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Supreme Court in 1944, has continuing application today. In years
past it has afforded courts a rationale for summary dismissal of many
prisoner complaints. A recognition in recent years, however, has developed and matured that a prisoner "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
141
from him by law."
There remains i reluctance, however, in some federal courts, to
assume primary responsibility for litigating prisoner complaints. These
courts are concerned about the flood of complaints which overburden
the federal courts. This is a problem which the courts can solve, not
by limiting prisoners' access to federal courts, but by directing attention
to the very root of the prisoners' complaints. Some federal courts are
beginning the practice of maintaining jurisdiction over a complaint
long after relief has been granted to an individual petitioner. Having
once become acquainted with the unconstitutional practices of a particular prison, it would seem logical to enter a court order requiring
the defendant prison officials to correct the practices and file periodic
reports informing the court of the progress that has been made. Perhaps
this would eventually curtail the large number of prisoner complaints.
It would certainly curtail the number of meritorious complaints. This
practice has the further advantage of being preventive in nature. While
the flood of complaints is bound to continue for a time, eventually
court ordered improvements could serve to limit the number.
Even today advocacy of court supervision of prison administrators
may be an unpopular position. In those circumstances, however, where
the prisoner has proved the existence of unconstitutional practices,
court intervention to effect a complete remedy is warranted. A certain
amount of supervision may be required until the problem is rectified.
Prison administration could still rest with the prison officials with the
courts offering guidelines as to what is required to fully observe constitutional rights in the context of a prison. Once prison officials have
discarded unconstitutional regulations and practices under federal
court direction, the number of prisoner complaints may begin to diminish. It must be remembered that correction and alleviation of a longexisting problem is always more burdensome than maintenance of the
ultimate solution.
141 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
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